

Ignorance and anti-negativity in the grammar: [or/some] and modified numerals

Puzzle. The disjunction *or* and the indefinite *some* NP_{SG} are similar: Given reference to the same domain of individuals, they are **truth-conditionally equivalent**, (1). Moreover, in a plain episodic context both give rise to speaker **ignorance** inferences, (2).

However, they also differ in surprising ways w.r.t. **compatibility with certainty** – *some* NP_{SG} is compatible with positive or negative speaker certainty about a specific member of the domain whereas *or* is not, (3)-(4) – and **anti-negativity**

		compatibility with certainty	
		no	yes
anti-negativity	no	<i>or</i>	CMNs
	yes	SMNs	<i>some</i> NP_{SG}

– *or* can take scope below negation but *some* NP_{SG} can't, (5) (although both are fine in downward-entailing environments such as the antecedent of a conditional or the restriction of a universal). Strikingly, comparative-modified numerals (CMNs) and superlative-modified numerals (SMNs) exhibit the exact same type of similarity and variation, (1')-(5').

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| <p>(1) Jo called Penny or Quincey / some student.
(= 1 iff $p \vee q$)</p> <p>(2) Who did Jo call? Penny or Quincey. / Some student.
(\rightsquigarrow ignorance: $\diamond p \wedge \diamond q$)</p> <p>(3) Jo called Penny. Therefore, he called #Penny, Quincey, or Ron / ✓some student.</p> <p>(4) Jo called #Penny, Quincey, or Ron / ✓some student, but not Penny.</p> <p>(5) Jo didn't call ✓Penny, Quincey, or Ron / #some student.</p> | <p>(1') Jo called less than 2 people / at most 1 person.
(= 1 iff $0 \vee 1$)</p> <p>(2') How many people did Jo call? Less than 2. / At most 1.
(\rightsquigarrow ignorance: $\diamond 0 \wedge \diamond 1$)</p> <p>(3') Jo called 2 people. Therefore, he called ✓less than 3 / #at most 2.</p> <p>(4') Jo called ✓less than 3 / #at most 2 people, but not 1.</p> <p>(5') Jo didn't call ✓less than 3 / #at most 2 people.</p> |
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Existing literature. Subsets of this puzzle have been noticed and/or analyzed in the literature (cf., e.g., [1], a.o., for anti-negativity in *some*; [2, 3], a.o., for ignorance in CMNs and SMNs; [4, 2, 5, 6], a.o., for anti-negativity in SMNs; [7, 8, 6], a.o., for the similarity between SMNs and disjunction). However, a theory that would capture all of (1)-(5) or all of (1')-(5'), and do so in a way that reflects the remarkable similarity between (1)-(5) and (1')-(5'), is still missing. The aim of this talk is to fill this gap.

A unified account of ignorance and anti-negativity in *or/some* NP_{SG} and CMNs/SMNs. Building on the alternatives-and-exhaustification approaches to epistemic indefinites and polarity sensitive items (cf. [9] and ref's therein), I account for the facts above as follows:

★ The truth conditions for (1)/(1') are (equivalent to) (6)/(6'). In particular, in a way that is commonly assumed for *or/some* NP_{SG} and will be defended for CMNs/SMNs, they make reference to a domain:

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| <p>(6) $\exists x \in \{\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}\} [C(j, x)]$
Abbreviated: $p \vee q$.</p> | <p>(6') $\max(\lambda d. \exists x[x = d \wedge P(x) \wedge C(j, x)]) \in \{\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}\}$
Abbreviated: $0 \vee 1$.</p> |
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★ Replacing the domain in the truth conditions with its subsets yields subdomain alternatives, DA:

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| <p>(7) $\{\exists x \in \{\mathbf{p}\} [C(j, x)], \exists x \in \{\mathbf{q}\} [C(j, x)]\}$
Abbreviated: $\{p, q\}$.</p> | <p>(7') $\{\max(\lambda d. \dots) \in \{\mathbf{0}\}, \max(\lambda d. \dots) \in \{\mathbf{1}\}\}$
Abbreviated: $\{0, 1\}$.</p> |
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(There are also scalar alternatives, but for reasons of space I leave them out, as they are not crucial here.)

★ Alternatives are factored into meaning via a silent exhaustivity operator \mathbf{O} . \mathbf{O} asserts the prejacent and negates the non-entailed alternatives. The DA of *or/some* NP_{SG} / CMNs/SMNS must be factored in in a pre-exhaustified form, ExhDA (obtained by applying \mathbf{O} to individual DA; I assume pre-exhaustification of a DA is done relative to other DA of the same size). Without an intervening operator, $\mathbf{O}_{\text{ExhDA}}$ fails:

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| <p>(8) $\mathbf{O}_{\text{ExhDA}} (p \vee q)$
 $= (p \vee q) \wedge \neg \underbrace{\mathbf{O} p}_{p \wedge \neg q} \wedge \neg \underbrace{\mathbf{O} q}_{q \wedge \neg p}$
 $\qquad \qquad \qquad \underbrace{\qquad}_{p \rightarrow q} \qquad \underbrace{\qquad}_{q \rightarrow p}$</p> <p>a. = $(p \vee q) \wedge p \wedge q$ (clash w/ scalar implic)</p> <p>b. = $(p \vee q) \wedge \neg p \wedge \neg q$, = \perp (G-trivial)</p> | <p>(8') $\mathbf{O}_{\text{ExhDA}} (0 \vee 1)$
 $= (0 \vee 1) \wedge \neg \underbrace{\mathbf{O} 0}_{0 \wedge \neg 1} \wedge \neg \underbrace{\mathbf{O} 1}_{1 \wedge \neg 0}$
 $\qquad \qquad \qquad \underbrace{\qquad}_{0 \rightarrow 1} \qquad \underbrace{\qquad}_{1 \rightarrow 0}$</p> <p>a. = $(0 \vee 1) \wedge 0 \wedge 1$ (logically impossible)</p> <p>b. = $(0 \vee 1) \wedge \neg 0 \wedge \neg 1$, = \perp (G-trivial)</p> |
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★ An O_{ExhDA} parse for episodic contexts is however possible if a null matrix level epistemic necessity modal \Box_S (akin to the Gricean *Bel_S* ‘the speaker believes ...’) is inserted as a last resort between O_{ExhDA} and its prejacent. This yields ignorance, capturing (2)/(2’).

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 (9) \quad O_{\text{ExhDA}} \Box_S (p \vee q) & (9') \quad O_{\text{ExhDA}} \Box_S (0 \vee 1) \\
 = \Box_S (p \vee q) \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S p}_{\Box_S p \rightarrow \Box_S q} \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S q}_{\Box_S q \rightarrow \Box_S p} & = \Box_S (0 \vee 1) \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S 0}_{\Box_S 0 \rightarrow \Box_S 1} \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S 1}_{\Box_S 1 \rightarrow \Box_S 0} \\
 \text{a.} \quad = \Box_S (p \vee q) \wedge \Box_S p \wedge \Box_S q & \text{a.} \quad = \Box_S (0 \vee 1) \wedge \Box_S 0 \wedge \Box_S 1 \\
 \quad \quad \quad \text{(clash w/ scalar implic)} & \quad \quad \quad \text{(logically impossible)} \\
 \text{b.} \quad = \Box_S (p \vee q) \wedge \neg \Box_S p \wedge \neg \Box_S q & \text{b.} \quad = \Box_S (0 \vee 1) \wedge \neg \Box_S 0 \wedge \neg \Box_S 1 \\
 \quad \quad \quad \boxed{\text{ignorance } \checkmark} & \quad \quad \quad \boxed{\text{ignorance } \checkmark}
 \end{array}$$

★ $O_{\text{ExhDA}} \Box_S$ above yielded ignorance about every element in the domain. How do we capture the contrasts relative to ignorance? *some NP_{SG} /CMNs*, but not *or/SMNs*, can prune their original DA set down to just a natural subset, e.g., just the non-singletons (NonSgDA) or just the singletons (SgDA). Exhaustification relative to the pruned sets yields compatibility with positive or negative certainty about a specific member of the domain, capturing (3)/(3’)-(4)/(4’). I illustrate below for CMNs. (Assume this only happens for domains with more than 2 elements, and if forced by a non-total ignorance context.)

$$\begin{array}{l}
 (10') \quad O_{\text{ExhNonSgDA}} \Box_S (0 \vee 1 \vee 2) \quad \boxed{\text{just NonSgDA} \Rightarrow \text{positive certainty about a specific element } \checkmark} \\
 = \Box_S (0 \vee 1 \vee 2) \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S (0 \vee 1)}_{\Box_S (0 \vee 1) \rightarrow \Box_S (1 \vee 2) \vee \Box_S (0 \vee 2)} \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S (1 \vee 2)}_{\Box_S (1 \vee 2) \rightarrow \Box_S (0 \vee 1) \vee \Box_S (0 \vee 2)} \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S (0 \vee 2)}_{\Box_S (0 \vee 2) \rightarrow \Box_S (0 \vee 1) \vee \Box_S (1 \vee 2)} \\
 \quad \quad \quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{verified, e.g., by } \Box_S 2 (\wedge \neg \Box_S 0 / \Box_S \neg 0 \wedge \neg \Box_S 1 / \Box_S \neg 1)}
 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l}
 (11') \quad O_{\text{ExhSgDA}} \Box_S (0 \vee 1 \vee 2) \quad \boxed{\text{just SgDA} \Rightarrow \text{negative certainty about a specific element } \checkmark} \\
 = \Box_S (0 \vee 1 \vee 2) \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S (0)}_{\Box_S 0 \rightarrow \Box_S 1 \vee \Box_S 2} \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S (1)}_{\Box_S 1 \rightarrow \Box_S 0 \vee \Box_S 2} \wedge \underbrace{\neg O \Box_S (2)}_{\Box_S 2 \rightarrow \Box_S 0 \vee \Box_S 1} \\
 \quad \quad \quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{verified, e.g., by } \Box_S \neg 1 (\wedge \neg \Box_S 0 \wedge \neg \Box_S 2)}
 \end{array}$$

★ Turning to negation (w/ a 2-element domain, for simplicity), note that each ExhDA below is incompatible with the prejacent. It is therefore already excluded by it, and its negation adds nothing. *Or/CMNs* are fine with this result, but *some NP_{SG} /SMNs* require that exhaustification relative to their ExhDA lead to proper strengthening (PS). This explains their anti-negativity, capturing (5)/(5’).

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 (12) \quad O_{\text{ExhDA}} \neg(p \vee q) & (12') \quad O_{\text{ExhDA}} \neg(0 \vee 1) \\
 = \neg(p \vee q) \wedge \neg O \neg p \wedge \neg O \neg q & = \neg(0 \vee 1) \wedge \neg O \neg 0 \wedge \neg O \neg 1 \\
 = \neg(p \vee q) \wedge \underbrace{\neg(\neg p \wedge q)}_{\text{already excl.}} \wedge \underbrace{\neg(\neg q \wedge p)}_{\text{already excl.}} & = \neg(0 \vee 1) \wedge \underbrace{\neg(\neg 0 \wedge 1)}_{\text{already excl.}} \wedge \underbrace{\neg(\neg 1 \wedge 0)}_{\text{already excl.}} \\
 = \neg(p \vee q) \quad \boxed{\text{*no PS} \Rightarrow \text{anti-negativity } \checkmark} & = \neg(0 \vee 1) \quad \boxed{\text{*no PS} \Rightarrow \text{anti-negativity } \checkmark}
 \end{array}$$

Summary and outlook. I provide a unified alternatives-and-exhaustification account of ignorance and anti-negativity in *or/some NP_{SG}* and *CMNs/SMNs* that captures similarity and variation w.r.t. these phenomena both within and between these pairs. In the talk I will also discuss further connections/extensions to the existing literature on epistemic indefinites and polarity sensitive items, on the one hand, and numerals, on the other.

References. [1] Szabolcsi (2004) Positive polarity–negative polarity. [2] Geurts & Nouwen (2007) At least et al.: The semantics of scalar modifiers. [3] Cremers, Coppock, Dotlacil & Roelofsen (2017). Modified numerals: Two routes to ignorance. [4] Nilsen (2007) At least – Free choice and lowest utility. [5] Cohen & Krifka (2014) Superlative quantifiers and meta-speech acts. [6] Spector (2015) Why are class B modifiers global PPIs? [7] Büring (2008) The least at least can do. [8] Kennedy (2015) A “de-Fregean” semantics (and neo-Gricean pragmatics) for modified and unmodified numerals. [9] Chierchia (2013) Logic in grammar: Polarity, free choice, and intervention.